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Background: To facilitate long-term safety surveillance of marketing drugs, many spontaneously reporting systems
(SRSs) of ADR events have been established world-wide. Since the data collected by SRSs contain sensitive personal
health information that should be protected to prevent the identification of individuals, it procures the issue of
privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP), that is, how to sanitize (anonymize) raw data before publishing.
Although much work has been done on PPDP, very few studies have focused on protecting privacy of SRS data
and none of the anonymization methods is favorable for SRS datasets, due to which contain some characteristics
such as rare events, multiple individual records, and multi-valued sensitive attributes.
Methods: We propose a new privacy model called MS(k, θ*)-bounding for protecting published spontaneous ADE
reporting data from privacy attacks. Our model has the flexibility of varying privacy thresholds, i.e., θ*, for different
sensitive values and takes the characteristics of SRS data into consideration. We also propose an anonymization
algorithm for sanitizing the raw data to meet the requirements specified through the proposed model. Our
algorithm adopts a greedy-based clustering strategy to group the records into clusters, conforming to an
innovative anonymization metric aiming to minimize the privacy risk as well as maintain the data utility for ADR
detection. Empirical study was conducted using FAERS dataset from 2004Q1 to 2011Q4. We compared our model
with four prevailing methods, including k-anonymity, (X, Y)-anonymity, Multi-sensitive l-diversity, and (α, k)
-anonymity, evaluated via two measures, Danger Ratio (DR) and Information Loss (IL), and considered three different
scenarios of threshold setting for θ*, including uniform setting, level-wise setting and frequency-based setting. We
also conducted experiments to inspect the impact of anonymized data on the strengths of discovered ADR signals.
Results: With all three different threshold settings for sensitive value, our method can successively prevent the
disclosure of sensitive values (nearly all observed DRs are zeros) without sacrificing too much of data utility. With
non-uniform threshold setting, level-wise or frequency-based, our MS(k, θ*)-bounding exhibits the best data utility
and the least privacy risk among all the models. The experiments conducted on selected ADR signals from
MedWatch show that only very small difference on signal strength (PRR or ROR) were observed. The results show
that our method can effectively prevent the disclosure of patient sensitive information without sacrificing data
utility for ADR signal detection.
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Conclusions: We propose a new privacy model for protecting SRS data that possess some characteristics
overlooked by contemporary models and an anonymization algorithm to sanitize SRS data in accordance with the
proposed model. Empirical evaluation on the real SRS dataset, i.e., FAERS, shows that our method can effectively
solve the privacy problem in SRS data without influencing the ADR signal strength.
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Spontaneous reporting systemTable 1 The 2 × 2 contingency table used for the identification
of ADRs
Suspected ADR Without the TotalBackground
It is well known that a new drug before hitting the mar-
ket needs to undergo a series of clinical trials to reveal
all possible adverse drug reactions (ADRs). Unfortu-
nately, many serious ADRs cannot be disclosed in the
premarketing stage through the limited number of vol-
unteers participate in clinical trials; on the contrary, they
can only be identified through long term surveillance of
extensive usages of the drug on the masses. Therefore,
most of highly developed countries have established
various spontaneous reporting systems (SRSs) to collect
adverse drug events (ADEs) as a data repository for ADR
detection and analysis, e.g., the FDA Adverse Event
Reporting System (FAERS) of the US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) [1], the UK Yellow Card scheme [2],
and the MedEffect Canada [3], among others.
Usually, the data collected by the SRSs contain sensitive
personal health information that should be protected to
prevent the identification of individuals. This procures the
need of anonymizing the raw data before being published,
namely privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) [4].
Although in the past few years there have been a lot of
researches on this topic, none of the anonymization
methods is favorable for SRS datasets, due to which con-
tain some characteristics, including rare events, multiple
individual records, and multi-valued sensitive attributes.
In this paper, we present a new privacy-preserving
model, called MS(k, θ*)-bounding, for protecting the pub-
lished spontaneous ADE reporting data from privacy at-
tacks. We also propose an anonymization algorithm for
sanitizing the raw data to meet the requirements specified
through the proposed model. Empirical study conducted
using FAERS datasets show that our method can effectively
prevent the disclosure of patient sensitive information
without sacrificing data utility for ADR signal detection. In
what follows, we present some background knowledge re-
lated to this work, including ADR signal detection and
privacy-preserving models, followed by a summarization of
our previous work [5] on the deficiency of contemporary
PPDP models for publishing SRS datasets.suspected ADR
Suspected drug a b a + b
Other drugs c d c + d
Total a + c b + d N = a + b + c + dSpontaneously reporting systems and ADR signal detection
According to WHO, the definition of ADRs or ADEs
is uncomfortable, noxious, unexpected, or potentiallyharmful reactions resulting from the use of given
medications for patients. Usually, an ADR signal
(rule) can be represented as an association between
symptoms and drugs with some extra conditions, for
example, a rule “Avandia, age > 18 years old ⇒ death.”
Statisticians have developed various criteria based on the
concept of measuring disproportionality or information
component (IC) to evaluate the significance of an ADR
signal [6]. The most widely adopted disproportionality-
based measurements are Proportional Reporting Ratio
(PRR) [7] and Reporting Odds Ratio (ROR) [8]. The PRR
measure is used by the U.K. Yellow Card database and UK
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA), while ROR is used by the Netherlands Pharma-
covigilance Foundation. All of these measurements can be
calculated using a contingency table as shown in Table 1.
Table 2 shows some ADR measures and thresholds that
commonly used in the pharmacovigilance community for
detecting ADR signals.
Privacy models for microdata publishing
Microdata refer to a kind of data which contains individ-
ual information and usually can be represented as tables
including tuples defined in a set of attributes, and we
can divide these attributes into the following categories:
 Explicit Identifiers (ID): These refer to attributes that
can uniquely identify each individual, such as SSN,
Name, etc.
 Quasi-identifiers (QID): These refer to attributes
that might be linked with external information to
re-identify some of the individuals, e.g., Sex, Age,
ZIP code, etc.
 Sensitive Attributes (SA): These refer to attributes
that contain sensitive information, such as Disease,
Salary, etc.
Table 2 Commonly used ADR measures and thresholds
Measure Formula Threshold
PRR a= aþbð Þc= cþdð Þ PRR − 1.96 × SD > 1
PRR≥ 2, a≥ 3, χ2≥ 4
ROR a=cb=d ROR − 1.96 × SD > 1
IC log2
a aþbþcþdð Þ
aþbð Þ aþcð Þ Expect(IC) − 1.96 × SD > 0
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attributes not fall into the above three categories.
Since Sweeney [9] pointed out that publishing micro-
data by only removing ID without paying attention to
QID may threat the privacy of data owners, there have
been a lot of researches on this topic [4]. These research
efforts towards protecting released microdata aim at
thwarting two primary types of privacy attacks, individual
disclosure and attribute disclosure.
Individual disclosure (also known as table linkage
attack) refers to the situation that a specific tuple for an
individual in the published table is re-identified. The
most famous privacy model for this purpose is k-ano-
nymity [9]. With k-anonymity, the data publisher should
generalize QID of the data such that each QID group
contains no less than k tuples, making a given record in-
distinguishable from at least k - 1 other records by QID.
Attribute disclosure (also known as attribute linkage at-
tack) refers to the situation that the sensitive attribute
value of an individual can be inferred without the neces-
sity to link the value to a specific tuple. The prevailing
model for this protection is l-diversity [10], which re-
quires each QID group contains at least l “well-repre-
sented” sensitive values so as to ensure the probability of
inferring the specific sensitive value within each QID
group will be no more than 1/l.
Problems of contemporary privacy models
We summarize our previous work on the deficiency of
contemporary PPDP models for publishing SRS datasets
[5]. First, we present the features of SRS data, and then
summarize the results of our analysis.
Special features of SRS data
 Rare Events: Usually, undiscovered or new ADRs are
rarely observed, so almost all criteria used in
measuring the significance of ADRs ignore or
overlook the frequency of ADRs. For example, the
MHRA measure may output a suspected signal even
it occurs only three times. With PPDP models, we
often generalize or suppress the records, which may
increase the risk of false positive as well as false
negative signals of ADRs, especially when we perform
stratified ADR detection by factors such as Age,
Gender, and Location, i.e., members of the typical QID. Multiple Individual Records: A typical SRS data
usually contains reports called follow-ups, which
complement the information of an initial report and
have to be merged with the initial report to form a
more accurate and complete version. Most of
contemporary PPDP models assume that there is
only one record for each individual, e.g., k-anonymity,
l-diversity. Overlooking the existence of multiple
individual records might impair the privacy
requirement to be achieved. For example, consider
a table satisfying k-anonymity. A QID group might
contain k tuples, all of which are of the same
individual, thus ruin the privacy requirement.
 Multi-valued Sensitive and Quasi-sensitive Attribute:
Quasi-sensitive attributes (QSA) are not sensitive
attributes, but as link to external knowledge may
reveal sensitive information of an individual. Typical
SRS datasets, e.g., FAERS, usually contain Drug and
PT (Preferred Terms of symptoms), each of which, if
being linked with external knowledge of clinical
treatments, could reveal the disease information of
an individual. For example, Prezista and Ritonavir
are commonly used together for treating HIV;
knowing a patient taking these medicines is almost
equivalent to perceiving him having HIV. Besides,
FAERS contains another attribute named INDI_PT,
which records the indications of the patient before
treatment. Values of this attribute can be sensitive
(represent some disease, e.g., Multiple Sclerosis) or
quasi-sensitive (describe symptoms of some illness,
e.g., Muscle Spasticity, possibly caused by Parkinson’s
disease). All of these three attributes are multi-valued,
i.e., containing more than one value. Very few PPDP
models can handle multi-valued sensitive attributes
and consider the existence of quasi-sensitive attributes.
Analysis of previous work
Our previous work in [5] can be summarized as follows:
(1)Variants of k-anonymity or l-diversity overlook the
existence of rare instances in the dataset.
(2)Only very few models, e.g., (X, Y)-privacy [11],
consider multiple individual records.
(3)Except QS l-diversity [12], no model notices the
existence of quasi-sensitive attributes, not to mention
the case of multivalued quasi-sensitive attributes.
(4)Most models entail the assumption of single
sensitive attribute, while very few embrace the
situation of multiple sensitive attributes, e.g., (α, k)-
anonymity [13], Multi-sensitive l-diversity [14].
(5)No model takes into account all of the
mentioned features of SRS datasets, which raises
the need to design a new PPDP model to handle
these features.
Table 3 A sample FAERS data satisfying MS(2, 0.4)-bounding
(a) Anonymized table
ISR CaseID Age Gender Country Drugs
001 001 [20–30] M USA Paracetamol
002 001 [20–30] M USA Paracetamol
003 002 [20–30] M USA Intron A, Antacid
004 002 [20–30] M USA Intron A, Antacid
005 003 [30–40] F UK Paracetamol
006 004 [30–40] F UK Antacid
(b) External table
Drug Diseases
Asprin Flu, Headache, Fever
Intron A Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, Leukemia, Melanoma
Paracetamol Headache, Fever
Antacid Stomachache, GERD
Lin et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2016, 16(Suppl 1):58 Page 24 of 63Methods
The proposed MS(k, θ*)-bounding model
To solve the aforementioned problems, we developed a
privacy model called Multi-Sensitive (k, θ*)-anonymity
(abbrev. MS(k, θ*)-anonymity). Let D be SRS data to be
published that consists of four disjoint sets of attributes,
QID, SA, QSA, and NSA, i.e., D = <QID, SA, QSA, NSA>,
and D* the released SRS data after anonymization. We
called the records with the same QID values a “QID-
group.” We also assume an external knowledge table E
about treatment is available, which can be constructed
from websites such as Drugs.com, wrongdiagnosis, etc.
For simplicity, let E contain a pair of attribute group
(QE, SE), where QE denotes the set of attributes that can
be linked with QSA in D, e.g., Drug, and SE the set of
sensitive attributes, e.g., Disease.
Definition 1 (Confidence). Let s be a sensitive value
in SA or SE. For a QID-group in D (or D
*) with value of
q, we define the probability that q have s as
conf q→sð Þ;
and the same probability after linking E via SA and SE as
conf q→s; Eð Þ:
Definition 2 (Confidence Bounding). Let S = {s1, s2,
…, sl} be the set of sensitive values to be protected and
θ* = (θ1, θ2, …, θl) be the user specified disclosure prob-
ability thresholds associated with S, where θi denotes the
threshold for si, 1 ≤ i ≤ l. That is, θi is an upper bound of
the confidence to infer any QID-group having si, with or
without external knowledge E, i.e.,
conf q→si; Eð Þ≤θi:
Note that S is a subset of all values legal in SA and
SE, i.e.,
SUA∈ SA∪ SE dom Að Þ;
where dom(A) represents the domain of attribute A.
Definition 3 (MS(k, θ*)-bounding). Given S and the
corresponding θ*, we say a release data D* satisfies MS(k,
θ*)-bounding if
(1)Every QID-group contains at least k distinct
individuals (cases);
(2)The confidence to infer any QID-group q having si is
less than θi, i.e., conf(q→ si, E) ≤ θi.
In MS(k, θ*)-bounding, we define θ* to control the ratio
of sensitive values in QID group because not all sensitive
values is “really” sensitive. For example, most diseases are
sensitive for people, but it does not matter when the
others know someone got a flu. This model can solve the
multiple individual records problem because k is definedby the distinct individuals, and it is easy to check whether
the QID group satisfies the model or not.
Another noteworthy thing is about the setting of con-
fidence bounding θ*. In general, as applying MS(k, θ*)-
bounding to the dataset, every θi in θ
* should be no less
than the frequency of si in the dataset, i.e., we must set
every θi so as to satisfy θi ≥ P(si). This is because after
generalization the occurrence of si in every QID-group is
no less than P(si), and so setting θi < P(si) nullifies the
work of anonymization, i.e., the result fails to meet the
privacy requirement. However, for a dataset containing
some relatively frequent sensitive values, we still can
apply MS(k, θ*)-bounding to the dataset using some
other methods like adding counterfeit records or sup-
pressing some of those sensitive values, though those
method may severely decrease the utility of the data.
Example 1. Table 3 illustrates a sample of the FAERS
data, where ISR and CaseID denote the IDs of a record
and an event, respectively. Since an event may have more
than one reporting records, a CaseID can correspond to
many different ISRs. Here we assume QID comprises
{Age, Gender, Country}. Table 3(a) shows the anonymized
table D* composed of two QID groups, ([20–30], M, USA)
and ([30–40], F, UK), each of which contains two different
events; Table 3(b) represents the external table E showing
knowledge of treating diseases with drugs. It is not hard to
derive that the probability of each disease associated with
a specific QID group is less than 0.4, e.g., conf([30–40], F,
UK→Headache, E) = 0.25. This anonymized table D* thus
satisfies MS(2, 0.4)-bounding.
Anonymization algorithm for MS(k, θ*)-anonymity
Algorithm basics
Our algorithm is a hybrid of greedy and clustering
approaches. We view each QID-group as a cluster and
Table 4 An example data
(a) A known group g
CaseID Gender Age Weight Indications
r1 Male Young Adult [50–75] I1
r2 Male Young Adult [50–75] I2, I3, I4
r3 Male Young Adult [50–75] I2, I3
r4 Male Young Adult [50–75] I2
(b) Isolated records
CaseID Gender Age Weight Indications
r5 Male Adocent 50 I1
r6 Female Adult 40 I3, I4
r7 Male Young Adult 80 I2, I3
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QID-groups.
Each QID-group (cluster) begins with a randomly se-
lected record, and then is gradually increased by adding
an isolated record that exhibits the best characteristic
among all candidates. This process continues until the
group is composed of k different cases. Finally, the QIDs
of all records belonging to the same cluster are general-
ized to the same value.
We use generalization rather than suppression as the
anonymization operation because suppression tends to
remove records corresponding to rare events. We adopt
both hierarchy-based generalization and hierarchy-free
generalization; the former is used when a value
generalization hierarchy is defined for the attribute (usu-
ally, it is categorical), otherwise the latter is used. For ex-
ample, we adopt the age hierarchy defined in MeSH
[16], a domain knowledge of value generalization hier-
archies widely used in medical and healthcare areas. In
the following, we describe the metric for evaluating an
isolated record quality.
Intuitively, the best record to be included into a QID-
group should exhibit the most similarity to the group.
This implies its addition will result in the least degree of
generalization (distortion of data, destruction of utility,
or information loss) to be performed on the QID attri-
butes of the group. Here in this study, we adapt the
measure of information loss defined in [15].
Definition 4 (Information Loss). Let g denote a
group (cluster) constructed during the execution of our
algorithm, where the QID comprise two different sets,
numerical attributes N1, N2, …, Nm, and categorical attri-
butes C1, C2, …, Cn, and each Ci is associated with a
generalization hierarchy Ti. The information loss (IL) of
group g is defined as follows:
IL gð Þ ¼ gj j 
Xm
i¼1
max Ni; gð Þ−min Ni; gð Þ










where max (Ni) (min(Ni)) and max(Ni, g) (min(Ni, g))
denote the maximum (minimum) values of attribute
Ni in the whole dataset and group g, respectively; |g|
denotes the number of records in g; h(Cj) is the
height of the hierarchy tree Tj, and h(Cj, g) the height
of the generalized value of Cj for all records in g, i.e.,
the lowest common ancestor in Tj with respect to
every Cj value in g.
The information loss measures how generalization im-
pact the data utility. As we are building a group g by
adding new records, we can use the difference of IL
(ΔIL) between the original group and the group withrecord r to determine the best record that produces the
least ΔIL, i.e.,
ΔIL g; rð Þ ¼ IL g∪ rf gð Þ– IL gð Þ; ð2Þ
and the best choice rbst is
rbst ¼ argminrΔIL g; rð Þ: ð3Þ
In addition to the data distortion, the privacy require-
ment is another factor critical for the determination of
the best record. This is because the inclusion of a new
record would increase the disclosure risk of some sensi-
tive values in the resulting QID-group. We introduce a
new parameter called Privacy Risk (PR) to measure the
risk of sensitive value disclosure incurred by adding new
records into the QID-group, thus alleviating the breach
of our privacy requirement.
Let Sr denote the set of sensitive values contained in
record r. Consider a QID-group g and a sensitive value
s∈Sr. Let σs(g) represent the number of records in g con-
taining sensitive value s. We define the maximum num-
ber of records in g, ηs(g), that will cause the breach of
the bound θs associated with s
ηs gð Þ ¼ ⌊max k; gj jf g  θs⌋; ð4Þ
and the privacy risk to explore s with the inclusion of
record r as
PRs g ∪ rf gð Þ ¼
σs gð Þ
ηs g ∪ rf gð Þ−σ s gð Þ





Since a record may contain multiple sensitive values,
the privacy risk of group g caused by including r can be
defined as the summation of the risk to each sensitive
value.
Definition 5 (Privacy Risk). Let g denote a group
(cluster) constructed during the execution of our
Fig. 1 Value hierarchy for age
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cluding a record r is









Finally, we refine ΔIL into ΔIL’ as follows:
ΔIL’ g; rð Þ ¼ ΔIL g; rð Þ  PR g; rð Þ; ð7Þ
and
rbst ¼ argminr ΔIL’ g; rð Þ: ð8Þ
Note that when all sensitive values in Sr are new to
group g, σs(g) = 0 and so is PR(g, r), which will dismiss
the effect contributed by information loss (ΔIL). To
avoid this situation, we add an increment into (6).
Example 2. Consider Table 4 which consists of a group
of four cases, r1 to r4, with g = {Male, Young Adult, 50–
75} and three isolated cases, r5 to r7. Figure 1 shows the
age hierarchy defined in MeSH and Fig. 2 depicts a simple
hierarchy for gender. Let QID = {Gender, Age, Weight}
and SA = {Indications}, and suppose k = 5, θ* = 0.6, and
weight range = 0 ~ 100. The information loss for group g is







¼ 4 0:25 ¼ 1;







¼ 5 1þ 0:25ð Þ ¼ 6:25















¼ 5 0:35ð Þ ¼ 1:75
Next, it is easy to compute the ΔILs.
ΔIL g; r5ð Þ ¼ 6:25 – 1:4 ¼ 4:85
ΔIL g; r6ð Þ ¼ 7:25 – 1:4 ¼ 5:85
ΔIL g; r7ð Þ ¼ 1:75 – 1:4 ¼ 0:35
The privacy risks are
PR g; r5ð Þ ¼ 1þ 1
3−1
¼ 1:5





PR g; r7ð Þ ¼ ∞
Finally, we can compute the ΔIL’s and obtain the best
choice rbst among r5 to r7, concluding rbst = r5.
rbst ¼ argminr ΔIL’ g; r5ð Þ; ΔIL’ g; r6ð Þ; ΔIL’ g; r7ð Þf g
¼ argminr 4:18 1:5; 5:85 3:5;∞f g ¼ r5
Detail description
Algorithms 1 and 2 present the description of our algo-
rithm, which is composed of two stages. The first stage
is to create as many QID-groups that satisfy MS(k, θ*)-
bounding as possible. We introduce a concept called
combined record (or super record) to handle the issue of
multiple individual records. That is, all records with the
same CaseID are combined into a super record before
the anonymization procedure. This avoids the abnormal
situation that members of this CaseID group will be,
after generalization, divided into different QID-groups,
which will cause larger bias on the data quality and per-
plex the process of identifying duplicate records during
ADR signal detection.
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into one super record per CaseID by generalizing the
values of those records. The generalization is neces-
sary because not all members of the same CaseID ex-
hibit the same QID value. This is due to the existence
of follow-up records, which represent compensation
for the initial report and so may contain update
information.Next, we create an empty group and add into it a ran-
domly selected record, then into which we add more re-
cords step by step, each with the least ΔIL’ (defined in
(7)) until the group satisfies MS(k, θ*)-bounding. Thirdly,
we choose a new record that is most distinguished from
the one chosen for creating the latest group and repeat
the same steps to grow the group. These steps are re-
peated until the remaining records cannot form a group,
e.g., the number of records is less than k or most of the
remaining records contain the same sensitive value.
The second stage is then activated by calling function
QID-generalization (see Algorithm 2). First, we take care
of the ungrouping records by adding each of them into
the group that produces the least ΔIL’ to ensure the util-
ity and meet the privacy requirement. Next, we split
those combined records back to their original records
(do not change the group they belong to). Finally, we
generalize all records within the same group into the
same QIDs such that the whole data set will satisfy
MS(k, θ*)-bounding.Results and Discussions
We have conducted a series of experiments to confirm if
our model is more suitable for anonymizing SRS data-
sets than prevailing PPDP models. We describe the de-
sign of each experiment, present the experimental
results, and state our observations.Experimental design
All experiments were conducted over FAERS datasets,
which is a SRS system provided by U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and released quarterly. Each re-
port in FAERS is uniquely identified by an attribute
called ISR, and contains an attribute CaseID to identify
distinct individuals, along with some demographic informa-
tion such as Weight, Age, and Gender, drugs information
such as drug name (Drug) and indication (INDI_PT), and
reaction information (PT).
We used {Weight, Age, Gender} as QID, CaseID as the
individual identifier, and used drug indication (INDI_PT)
and drug reaction (PT) as SA. Datasets from 2004Q1 to
2011Q4 were selected to build the test sets, where any
record with QID containing missing values was discarded.
Four prevailing PPDP models were evaluated against
our model. They are k-anonymity, (X, Y)-anonymity,
Multi-sensitive l-diversity, and (α, k)-anonymity. These
models were chosen because each of them is the repre-
sentative or the prevailing models, and can be applied to
anonymize SRS data without additional modification;
this is why l-diversity is replaced by Multi-sensitive
l-diversity.
All models were evaluated from two aspects: the qual-
ity of resulting anonymized dataset, measured by two
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ence to ADR signals.
For the anonymization quality, we considered two
measurements. The first one called Normalized Informa-
tion Loss (NIL) is used to measure the data utility, defined
as follows:
NIL Dð Þ ¼ 1






where D* is the anonymized data table, ng denotes the
number of QID-groups in D*, g denotes a QID-group,
and |QID| the cardinality of QID. The value of NIL
ranges over [0, 1]; larger NIL means poorer data utility.
The second one called Dangerous Ratio (DR) is used
to measure the privacy risk of anonymized dataset, de-
fined as follows:
DR ¼ number of dangerous QID−groups
number of QID−groups
ð10Þ
A QID-group is dangerous if it contains at least one
unsafe sensitive value, that is, the attacker’s confi-
dence for inferring that value is higher than the speci-
fied threshold. In this sense, the DR measure also
estimates the privacy-preserving quality of an anon-
ymized table.
For the influence to ADR signals, we inspect the im-
pact of anonymized data on the strength of observed
ADR rules. Following our previous work in [17], we
chosen from FDA MedWatch [18] all significant ADR
rules that render withdrawal or warning of the drugs
and associated with patient demographics, such as age
or gender conditions. Detail description of these ADR
rules is shown in Table 5.
Since our model allows non-uniform settings of confi-
dence bounding, i.e., θ*, we considered three different



















WARFARIN Myocardial infarction 60~ 1940 2014
REVATIO Death ~18 2008 2014different settings: 1) Uniform setting for θ*, i.e., all confi-
dences of symptoms were set to the same value (0.2 or
0.4); 2) Level-wise specification, that is, all symptoms (or
diseases) were classified into three levels, high sensitive,
low sensitive, and non-sensitive. Those symptoms cor-
responding to high sensitive are assigned a smaller
threshold, i.e., 0.2, low sensitive are assigned a larger
threshold, i.e., 0.4, and non-sensitive are assigned to 1; 3)
Frequency-based strategy, the threshold of each symptom
is determined based on the idea: “The more frequently the
symptom occurs, the less sensitive it is.”
Results for uniform confidence setting
We assume every symptom is of the same sensitivity with
confidence bounded by 0.2 or 0.4. Analogously, α is set to
0.2 or 0.4 for (α, k)-anonymity, while k (or l) = 5, 10, 15, 20
for k-anonymity, (X, Y)-anonymity, Multi-sensitive l-diver-
sity, and our MS(k, θ*)-bounding. First, we compared
the data utility generated by each anonymization method.
Figures 3 and 4 show the resulting NILs for every method,
where MS l-diversity means Multi-sensitive l-diversity.
Panels inside are for better view of data position, and ap-
plicable to all following figures. Since the results for k (or l)
= 10, 15 are somewhere in between those for k (or l) = 5, 20
and conform to the overall trend, hereafter we omit these
two cases. From the obtained results, we observe that
1. k-anonymity and (X, Y)-anonymity are good at
preserving the data utility, and both exhibit nearly
identical results, which are less than those generated
by our methods.
2. (α, k)-anonymity and our model yield similar NIL
results, because under uniform setting the only
difference between (α, k)-anonymity and our model
is that (α, k)-anonymity does not consider duplicate
reports, yielding not too much effect in information
loss. Furthermore, (α, k)-anonymity and our model
suffer from much less information loss when the
confidence threshold is set relatively higher
(0.4 vs 0.2).
3. Multi-sensitive l-diversity causes much more
information loss than the other models because the
top-down method tends to create larger QID-groups
than that by bottom-up method.
4. Even in larger threshold setting, the information loss
generated by our method is around 5 to 40 times of
that by k-anonymity and (X, Y)-anonymity, though
the values are still small, normally between 0.01 to
0.2; the larger k value is, so is NIL. That it, the data
utility decreases as larger QID-group is allowed.
It is noteworthy that some datasets anonymized by
our method with lower θ produce very high NILs, i.e.,
2004Q4, 2007Q1, and 2010Q3. After further inspection
Fig. 3 Comparison of models on NILs with θ* (or α) = 0.2 and k (or l) = 5 or 20
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tain some relatively high frequent symptoms. For ex-
ample, there are 22,730 reports (without missing values)
in 2007Q1, and 3,890 (17.1 %) of them recorded “Dia-
betes Mellitus Non-Insulin-Dependent,” and in 2010Q3,Fig. 4 Comparison of models on NILs with θ* (or α) = 0.4 and k (or l) = 5 or12,833 of 63,838 (20.1 %) reports containing “Smoking
Cessation Therapy.” In this situation, it is hardly to apply
(α, k)-anonymity or our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with α (so
as θ) = 0.2 (<20.1 %) to this dataset. It looks like uniform
threshold setting of our model is not suitable to data with20
Lin et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2016, 16(Suppl 1):58 Page 30 of 63high frequent sensitive values, but in most scenarios, the
more frequent the values occur, the lesser sensitive they
are. All we need is to adopt non-uniform setting for θ*, as
to be shown later.
Next, we compared the privacy risk raised by each anon-
ymization method. Figures 5 and 6 depict the resulting
DRs for all methods. From the obtained results, we ob-
serve that
1. Our MS(k, θ*)-bounding yields no DR because the
flexibility to set θ* according to user requirement.
On the contrary, (α, k)-anonymity would suffer from
some DRs because QID-groups contain duplicate
reports, which may decrease actual group size,
causing violation of the privacy requirement. While
k is getting larger, the probability of duplicate
reports accumulated to the same group is increasing,
further aggravating DRs.
2. Multi-sensitive l-diversity does not perform well on
protecting the sensitive values. This is because it
only guarantees the number of records with distinct
sensitive values in each group no less than l, which
may fail to thwart the attacker’s confidence on
inferring the patient symptoms.
For those models not considering confidence thresh-
old on sensitive values, including k-anonymity and (X,
Y)-anonymity, it can be observed that the larger k is,Fig. 5 Comparison of models on DRs with θ* (or α) = 0.2 and k (or l) = 5 orthe lower DR being generated. That it, the data privacy
risk increases as larger QID-group is allowed.
Results for level-wise confidence setting
To inspect the applicability of our model to more prac-
tical situation, we also adopted level-wise setting of θ*.
In practice, most symptoms or indications are not
“really” sensitive. We choose group of symptoms called
“Acquired immunodeficiency syndromes” (a High Level
Term (HLT) in MedDRA), which contains 32 PTs and
most of them are similar to AIDS, as “high sensitive”
with confidence threshold = 0.2, and another two groups
called “Coughing and associated symptoms” and “Allergies
to foods, food additives, drugs and other chemicals,”
which contain 44 PTs, as “non-sensitive” symptoms
with confidence threshold = 1. The confidence thresh-
olds of symptoms not belonging to the above groups
are set to 0.4.
We compared our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with those
models considering sensitive values, including Multi-
sensitive l-diversity and (α, k)-anonymity. The parameter
setting is α = 0.2 and 0.4, and k (or l) = 5, 10, 15, and 20.
Figures 7 and 8 show the resulting NILs and DRs, re-
spectively. From the obtained results, we observe that
1. All NILs generated except by MS(k, θ*)-bounding
are the same as observed previously, but DRs are
different because of various threshold settings.20
Fig. 6 Comparison of models on DRs with θ* (or α) = 0.4 and k (or l) = 5 or 20
Fig. 7 Comparison of our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with level-wise setting with other models on NILs with k (or l) = 5 or 20
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Fig. 8 Comparison of our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with level-wise setting with other models on DRs with k (or l) = 5 or 20
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duplicate records are rare, (0.2, k)-anonymity
generate very few DRs. However, the generated
NIL is very high for data with high frequent
sensitive value that may decrease data utility
severely.
3. MS(k, θ*)-bounding produces only a little
larger NIL than (0.4, k)-anonymity because in
this level-wise specification, most symptoms
receive confidence threshold at 0.4. In contrast,
MS(k, θ*)-bounding does not produce any
DR but (0.4, k)-anonymity violates the
privacy requirement more often due to
overlooking duplicate records.
In summary, the performance of our MS(k, θ*)-bound-
ing is better than the other models, while Multi-sensitive
l-diversity yields the worst performance.
Results for frequency-based confidence setting
Finally, we consider another scenario of confidence set-
ting: the threshold of a symptom is set according to its
frequency in the dataset. We calculated the frequencies
of all symptoms appear in the dataset and set the confi-
dence thresholds of the most 10 % frequent symptoms
to 1, the last 10 % frequent symptoms to 0.2, and the
remaining to 0.4, respectively.Again, we compared our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with Multi-
sensitive l-diversity and (α, k)-anonymity with the same par-
ameter settings, i.e., α = 0.2 and 0.4, and k (or l) = 5, 10, 15,
and 20. Figures 9 and 10 show the resulting NILs and DRs,
respectively. From the obtained results, we observe that
1. As mentioned previously, all NILs generated except
by MS(k, θ*)-bounding are the same as the uniform
setting, while DRs are different because of different
threshold settings.
2. All models generate less DRs than that by
level-wise setting, because most dangerous
groups appearing in the previous experiments
are caused by high frequent symptoms, whose
thresholds are set to 1 in this experiment.
3. Even 90 % of θ's in θ* are set to 0.4 or lower, our
MS(k, θ*)-bounding produces very small NIL than
(0.4, k)-anonymity when being applied to data with
high frequent symptoms such as 2004Q1 and 2007Q1.
In FAERS data, there are more than 20,000 different
symptoms, which will require much researching effort and
background knowledge to determine the threshold of each
symptom. The frequency-based approach is a simple but
reasonable method, and with this threshold definition, our
MS(k, θ*)-bounding exhibits the best data utility and the
least privacy risk among all the models we examined.
Fig. 9 Comparison of our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with frequency-based setting with other models on NILs with k (or l) = 5 or 20
Fig. 10 Comparison of our MS(k, θ*)-bounding with frequency-based setting with other models on DRs with k (or l) = 5 or 20
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We also conducted an experiment to inspect the impact of
anonymized data on the strengths of discovered ADR rules.
For each ADR rule shown in Table 5, we computed and
checked the difference on the number of events, PRR and
ROR measures between the original datasets and anon-
ymized datasets. Since all rules exhibit similar pheno-
menon, we only show the results of the following rule
AVANDIA, age > 18⇒CEREBROVASCULAR ACCIDENT.
Figure 11 depicts the occurrence and strength of the
above rule in the original dataset (original count and ori-
ginal PRR) and from which the difference yielded from
the dataset anonymized by Multi-sensitive l-diversity,
(0.2, k)-anonymity, (0.4, k)-anonymity, and our MS(k, θ*)-
bounding with frequency-based setting, with k = 20. The
obtained results show that
1. Multi-sensitive l-diversity does not perform well
because of the top-down strategy, which is less
flexible to create QID-groups.
2. Most of the time there is no difference between the
original and anonymized datasets except Multi-sensitive
l-diversity. All of them are less than five, and the
extreme value only occurs when original count is
large (more than 80).
3. Not surprisingly, only very small difference on PRR
ranging from −1 to 1 were observed from the
anonymized datasets (except Multi-sensitive l-diversity),
which nearly can be ignored.Fig. 11 Comparison of rule occurrence and strength (in PRR) generated
different methodsThese observations reveal that our method can effect-
ively solve the privacy problem in SRS datasets without
overlooking rare events and influencing the ADR signal
strength.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new PPDP model for pro-
tecting SRS data that possess some characteristics over-
looked by contemporary models, including rare events,
multiple individual records, and multi-valued sensitive
attributes. We also presented an anonymization algo-
rithm to sanitize SRS data in accordance with the pro-
posed model. Empirical studies showed that our method
can prevent the disclosure of personal sensitive informa-
tion without sacrificing the data utility and biasing the
discovered ADR signals.
Although our approach is designed mainly for SRS
data, it can also be applied to other types of medical data
or applications with features analogous to SRS data; for
example, electronic health records (EHRs), which con-
tain more detailed private information and so deserve
further investigation.
We also notice that FAERS data contain lots of miss-
ing values. Existing PPDP methods usually ignore the
presence of missing values, simply deleting them before
executing data anonymization. However, for data with
enormous missing values, like SRS data, deleting all re-
cords with missing values may ruin the data utility ser-
iously, so how to deal with missing values is an interestingfrom original dataset and anonymized dataset by
Lin et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2016, 16(Suppl 1):58 Page 35 of 63issue. Another important and challenging issue goes to
continuous data publishing [11, 19]. Typically, SRS data
are released sequentially. Combining related releases
would sharpen the identification of an individual record
or sensitive information. We are endeavoring to extend
our current approach to solve these problems.
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